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Abstract 
The historical literature on Cameroon’s Anglophone Crisis traces its origin to the failure to 
implement the Foumban Constitutional Agreement. The current study adds a new perspective: 
Based on extensive field work in Cameroon and a variety of primary and secondary sources, this 
paper argues that Cameroon’s Anglophone Crisis, which began in October 2016, degenerated 
into violence because of a catalogue of miscalculations made by President Paul Biya’s regime. It 
also argues that the crisis has had a devastating impact on the way of life in the Anglophone 
region. This paper concludes with recommendations on what needs to be done to turn the tide in 
the Anglophone region. This study not only fills an important gap in the literature on the 
Anglophone Crisis and on the struggle for change in the country; it also contributes to 
postcolonial Cameroonian and African historiography overall. 
Introduction 
Recent political struggles in Cameroon have engulfed the nation into what is known as the 
Anglophone Crisis. A peaceful protest started in October 2016 by lawyers and teachers quickly 
turned violent, as Cameroon President Paul Biya’s military responded to the protest with 
intimidation, arrests, and torture. Some responded with a call for complete secession of the 
Anglophone regions from La République du Cameroun and the creation of a virtual Ambazonia 
Republic and an interim government in exile. They formed a military wing, Ambazonia Defence 
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Forces, and used it to attack and disrupt economic and social services in the region. As of June 
2019, four million people had been affected by the crisis: Over 1.3 million needed humanitarian 
assistance; over 450,000 were internally displaced; over thirty-two thousand became refugees in 
Nigeria; and over two thousand have been killed. And the conflict rages on today (United 
Nations 2019; Africanews 2019). 
In The Wretched of the Earth, Frantz Fanon (1963) argues that eventually an oppressor 
overreaches and the people turn to violence as “the only thing that pays.” Violence becomes a 
“cleansing force” for the oppressed, and one way for them to gain “self-respect” (Fanon, 61, 94). 
The Anglophone Crisis fits into Fanon’s analysis. The actions of Biya’s military machine to 
peaceful gatherings triggered young men to create the Ambazonia army and turn to violence. 
Initially, the response of protesters was spontaneous and unplanned, but with time it became 
more organized.  After witnessing the burning of their homes and communities by Biya’s 
military, losing relatives to the conflict, and experiencing chronic unemployment and poverty, 
the protesters took up arms and turned to violence (International Crisis Group 2017).  The young 
men who ignited the flames had grown fed up at the unfulfilled promises of reunification. The 
young men were tired of hanging out and doing nothing, and as responses to questionnaires 
would show, the Anglophone Crisis aggravated an already desperate situation for the region’s 
youths who made up over 60 percent of the population. While officially the nation’s youth 
unemployment was placed at a little over 5 percent, the reality on the ground, especially in the 
Anglophone region, shows the figure to be significantly higher. The World Bank reported that 
the poverty levels in the two Anglophone regions, Northwest and Southwest, in 2019 were 57 
percent and 21 percent respectively—among the highest in the nation (World Bank 2019). 
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This paper argues that the Anglophone Crisis arose from a catalog of miscalculations 
made by Biya’s regime. It also reveals that the crisis has had a devastating impact in the 
Anglophone regions including an erosion of aspects of the people’s way of life. This paper 
concludes with recommendations on what needs to be done to turn the tide in the Anglophone 
regions. The analysis builds on but also takes a fresh approach from the existing literature 
(Awasom 2000; Konings and Nyamnjoh 2003; Konings and Nyamnjoh 1997; Anyefru 2017; 
Nguh Fon 2019; Achime 2018; Amaazee 1990; Nfi 2014; Anyangwe 2018; Kamé 2018, 108-
109; Nyamnjoh and Rowlands 1998; Pommerolle and Heungoup 2017). This study relies 
extensively on the voices of locals, allowing for analysis by Cameroonians living through the 
crisis. Field work took place in the Cameroonian cities of Yaoundé, Bamenda, Buea, Douala, 
Limbe, Kumba, and Tiko between April 2017 and May 2019. Data came from 400 open-ended 
questionnaires distributed to both Francophone and Anglophone residents, as well as oral 
interviews. Of the 225 responses to questionnaires, seventy-five came from Francophones, the 
rest from Anglophones. Of the 130 people contacted for oral interviews, 50 participated; forty 
were Anglophones, while ten were Francphones. Given the level of suspicion and fear that 
resulted from the Anglophone Crisis, many expressed reluctance to participate in the project. 
Those who participated were assured of anonymity. Among those interviewed were students, 
petit traders,1 farmers, religious leaders, teachers, unemployed persons, civil servants, 
homemakers, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and businesspeople. Their formal education 
levels ranged from elementary school to advanced degrees. Respondents were often the most 
negatively affected by the crisis. Some lost jobs, businesses, and homes; many witnessed upfront 
the brutality of the conflict.2 These oral sources allow this paper to analyze the impact of the 
crisis on the people’s way of life. 
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This study also discusses the increasing importance of social media as a new weapon in 
protest activities in the region. It argues that social media was a game-changer during the crisis. 
It was used effectively to inform, plan, and mobilize supporters of the protest. This paper 
integrates Francophone voices in the analysis of the crisis. In doing so it challenges traditional 
perceptions that Francophones dismissed the Anglophone protest as something formented by a 
few people determined to destabilize the nation. Finally, this study fills an important gap in the 
literature on the Anglophone Crisis and the struggle for change in the country; it also contributes 
to postcolonial Cameroon and African historiography overall. 
Contextualizing the Crisis in the Nation’s History 
Cameroon, typically referred to as “Africa in miniature,” has a population of twenty-five million 
people belonging to 230 ethnic groups and speaking over two hundred languages. Annexed by 
Germany in 1884, Cameroon remained a German colony until 1916, when Germany was pushed 
out of the colony; in 1922, it split into two unequal halves and fell under the rule of Britain and 
France. Britain received one-fifth of the former German Kamerun, a narrow strip of territory 
stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to Lake Chad. Britain outsourced its own section of 
Cameroon to Northern and Southern Nigeria. Both Cameroons, for administrative reasons, were 
treated as two separate territories, but very limited economic development took place there. The 
history of the region’s development under British rule has been well covered (Amaazee 1990; 
Ngoh 2019). In 1960, French Cameroon obtained independence as the new Republic of 
Cameroon, and in a plebiscite on February 11, 1961, British Southern Cameroons voted to 
reunify with it. That July, representatives from both sides met in Foumban and created a a two-
state federation approved in October as the Federal Republic of Cameroon. The 1961 
constitution promised much, including equality of both federated states, respect of the political 
and economic institutions of each state, promotion of bilingualism in the country, and economic 
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development of both states. However, the reverse was true for the Anglophone regions. 
Anglophone Cameroon received limited political and economic rights. Even after the nation 
promoted its image as a bilingual nation, English was systematically marginalized. The 
Anglophone Crisis, therefore, began from the very creation of the Federal Republic of 
Cameroon. Each subsequent generation within the Anglophone regions has protested 
Francophone domination of their region (Konings and Nyamnjoh 2003; Achimbe 2018; Le Vine 
1961, 7-8). 
Though Anglophone residents made up roughly twenty percent of the country, they felt 
cheated out of key ministerial positions such as defense, finance, public service, external 
relations, and director of civil cabinet at the presidency. They felt cheated out of major positions 
such as general manager in companies (Anyefru 2017; Takougang and Amin 2018; Mbipgo 
2016). Moreover, even though since 1992 the prime minister has typically come from the 
Anglophone region, he is not next in command; the next in command is the president of the 
senate (Achimbe 2018). In short, Anglophones felt left out of the vital center of power in 
Cameroon. 
In 1982, Biya succeeded Ahmadou Ahidjo, Cameroon’s first president, in a peaceful 
transfer of power and signaled that he would preserve Anglophone cultural heritage and 
institutions. He said as much when he visited Buea and even spoke in English. In Bamenda, he 
labeled the town his “second home,” reminding people that though he was a Beti/Bulu, he was 
president of all Cameroonians (Ndi 2016, 264). But within a few short months, he resorted to his 
predecessor’s policies. Less than a year into Biya’s leadership, his minister of national education, 
René Ze Nguele, designed plans to submerge into the French educational system one of 
Anglophones’ most significant educational pillars, the General Certificate of Education (GCE). It 
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was a necessary step, he argued, toward the harmonization of the two educational systems 
(Konings and Nyamnjoh 2003, 163, 172). 
Simultaneously, within two years of taking office, Biya made one of his most daring 
moves when he signed Law No. 84/001 of February 4, 1984. This law changed the name of the 
country to the Republic of Cameroon, the name East Cameroon took when it obtained 
independence in 1960. Anglophones were furious. Their leaders had been neither consulted nor 
given any advance warning, and as Emmanuel Anyefru has written, Biya’s action was 
“unilaterally and unconstitutionally decreed” (2017, 108). Anglophone leader Fon Gorji Dinka, a 
former president of the Cameroon Bar Association, had a straightforward reaction, informing 
Biya that changing the name of the country nullified the Foumban Constitutional Agreement 
(Konings and Nyamnjoh 2003, 73). Dinka advocated that Anglophone Cameroon withdraw from 
the Republic of Cameroon to form the Republic of Ambazonia. Though Dinka’s pronouncement 
received minimal support at that time, his action revived a sense of Southern Cameroons’ 
consciousness, which until then had remained buried somewhere within avid nationalists of the 
region. It was only a matter of time before such consciousness caught the attention of many. 
However, the name change was not the only move undertaken by Biya during his first ten 
years as president. As Anthony Ndi (2016) has noted, many of the Anglophone region’s 
economic signposts, such as the Cameroon Bank, Powercam, West Cameroon Marketing Board, 
and the Limbe seaport, were either forced out of business through excessive centralization of 
everything in Francophone Cameroon or outrightly closed down. Anglophone nationalists vowed 
to challenge the destruction of their region’s economy. 
The political liberation of the 1990s offered an opening. Protest activities began with 
villes mortes (ghost towns); other political parties were legalized; and movements and groups 
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that challenged Biya’s policies emerged. For example, the teachers’ unions and trade unions 
began playing a more visible role. But the most significant development of the time was the 
formation of the Social Democratic Front (SDF), which arose as a major political party and, 
according to some observers, was the party that won the 1992 presidential election. The court 
gave the victory to Biya. 
The following year, 1993, Anglophone nationalists organized the All Anglophone 
Conference I in Buea and, a year later, the All Anglophone Conference II in Bamenda. These 
two conferences produced the Buea Declaration and the Bamenda Proclamation respectively. In 
addition to listing how Anglophone Cameroon had been mistreated and discriminated against, 
the Bamenda Declaration called for zero-option (secession) if federalism was not restored within 
a reasonable time. To counter this request for a return to federalism, Biya signed a 
decentralization decree—a decree that to this day remains elusive at the implementation level. 
Created in 1995 was the Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC), a pro-secession 
organization that supported zero-option. However, the generation that produced the document 
did not provide a roadmap for achieving secession—a weakness that became a glaring one 
during the current conflict. Few anticipated the destructive nature that has characterized the 
conflict. 
Road to the October 2016 Crisis and the Urgency of the Moment 
Clearly, the sources of Cameroon’s Anglophone Crisis are deeply rooted in the region’s history, 
so the more recent strikes by lawyers and teachers should be seen as a continuation of an 
expression of Anglophone nationalism designed to improve the economic and social conditions 
of the people in the region. In October 2016, the Anglophone Common Lawyers Association 
called for the Biya government to respond to two memoranda the association had sent to the 
president and his prime minister, dated May 9, 2015, and February 13, 2016. The memoranda 
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resulted from a series of meetings and a general dissatisfaction with what the lawyers referred to 
as a “deliberate and well-planned programme of whittling away and replacing the Common-Law 
rules of Criminal, Civil procedure, and of evidence, with a system and culture of French-inspired 
or copied Civil Law.” They requested the “restoration of Common Law-inspired Rules of 
practice and procedures” in the Anglophone regions (Ngoh 2019, 389; Mbunwe and Mbuwil 
October 3, 2016). In the memoranda, the lawyers asked the Biya government to “redeploy All 
Civil Law magistrates from the Northwest and Southwest Regions and in the same vein deploy 
All Common Law magistrates from civil law jurisdiction to the Common Law jurisdiction.” 
They also complained about the failure to translate Organisation pour l’harmonisation en 
Afrique du droit des affaires (OHADA) into English as an example of the government’s 
marginalization of English. Lawyers stated that they planned a strike for October 11-14 because 
the government failed to address their grievances. But on the eve of the strike, on October 10, the 
government brought in the military, which harassed and attacked them (Adams and Bouddih, 
October 11, 2016; Mbunwe and Mbuwil, October 3, 2016, and November 25, 2016; Mua, 
November 24, 2016). The local population shuddered at the response from the government. 
Soon after that, teachers also voted to go on strike. They too had registered similar 
grievances, blasting a system that they insisted consistently undermined the Anglophone 
educational institutions. The teachers’ organizations, including Teachers Association of 
Cameroon (TAC) and Cameroon Teachers Trade Union (CATTU), agreed to support the 
lawyers’ strike. In declaring this support for the lawyers’ strike, Wilfred Tassang, national 
executive secretary of CATTU, raised the stakes when he noted that the struggle was much more 
than a request for fair wages and improved living conditions—it was an “Anglophone struggle.” 
He added, “This is time for us to rise up as one” (Ngoh 2019, 390; Mbipgo, December 30, 2016; 
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Mbunwe, June 30, 2017; Fokwen 2017). The government’s response to the teachers’ strike 
mirrored the government’s response to the lawyers’ strike: arrests, threats, and intimidation. Of 
course, as a result of the strike, schools were closed, and courts remained empty. Students did not 
finish the first term of the 2016-17 academic year. To more effectively coordinate their efforts, 
lawyers and teachers formed the Cameroon Anglophone Civil Society Consortium (CACSC) on 
December 6, 2016, and they made Nkongho Felix Agbor Balla president, while Fontem Aforteka 
Neba became the secretary general. The organization emerged as a result of government failure 
to respond to the demands of the lawyers and the teachers. Initially, it called for an end to 
marginalization and negotiation, but with continuous government violence, the demands quickly 
moved to a call for the return to federalism. 
But government response to the protest was a miscalculation. Rather than keeping the 
strikers divided, its response forced lawyers and teachers to act in unison for a common purpose. 
They began to coordinate strategies and to share information. As a result, the movement gained 
momentum in urban and rural areas of the region, thereby changing the dynamics of the protest 
(The Post, November 28, 2016). 
As if the Biya team did not have enough problems, less than a month after the lawyers 
and teachers joined forces, on November 28, students at the University of Buea went on strike. 
As had the lawyers and teachers, the students began their grievances with a request to improve 
conditions on campus, then quickly turned to other matters. They resented, for example, that the 
50,000 francs CFA (Central African francs) Presidential Excellence Award had not been 
distributed to deserving students and protested the charge of 10,000 francs CFA levied on 
students for late tuition payment (Cameroon Postline, November 28, 2016). They also argued 
that the policies of then-Vice Chancellor Nalova Lyonga were detrimental to the university. 
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During the strike, Lyonga invited onto campus the military, which brutalized, raped, and tortured 
students and dragged them to jail (Scholars at Risk Network, November 28, 2016). 
But the harsh military response backfired. These university students were part of a new 
generation. They had grown up with android phones and had regularly turned to Facebook, 
Instagram, WhatsApp, Twitter, and so on, and they had the capacity to reach thousands of people 
either with their phones or with the click of a mouse on their computers. The nature of protest 
activities in the twenty-first century saw drastic change, evident in these students and their 
situation: intense youth activism, social media, improvement in communication and transport, 
the resilience of the people, and their determination. Among the most defining events of the 
protest were images of university students being beaten, dragged in mud, handcuffed, chained on 
seats in military vehicles, and hauled off to jail (CMTV Buzz 2016). These images galvanized 
youths all over the region. These photos and videos turned out to be a game-changer for many. 
Students supported the no-school strike, and classes at the University of Buea were canceled. 
For whatever reason, the Biya team had either underestimated the protest or planned to 
rely solely on military response without paying attention to these very different times. Whatever 
the thinking, as events later showed, it turned out to be a miscalculation of immense proportion. 
It was no longer the 1990s. The government underestimated the power of social media to inform, 
educate, and mobilize the population, especially those at the grassroots level. It underestimated 
the power of social media to be used to blur the lines between fact and “fake news,” propaganda, 
and outright lies. Even though the Biya team also used social media, it never had a rapid-
response team for what it termed “fake news” or other forms of information. Social media 
combined with the harsh military response likely did more to garner support for the strike than 
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any one person could have done (The Post, November 14, 2016). Indeed, the government grossly 
underestimated the power of social media. 
Biya and the military should have known better. Traditionally, attacks on peaceful 
demonstrators had often backfired, and Cameroon was no exception. Those attacks on supporters 
of the strike were carried on social media, thereby magnifying the crisis. Okada boys, taxi 
drivers, farmers, unemployed persons, and many others came out in support of the teachers and 
lawyers (The Guardian Post, November 29, 2016; The Post, December 5, 2016). “You cannot 
kill an idea with military weapons,” a respondent wrote in a questionnaire, reflecting the opinion 
of many others. Repeatedly, respondents scorned what they labeled as a “military occupation” of 
the Anglophone regions. Interviewees stated that it was a protest against “colonial oppression,” 
“marginalization,” “exploitation,” “government corruption,” “military brutality,” “dominance of 
the French language,” “economic injustice,” “discrimination,” “maltreatment,” “unemployment,” 
“second-class citizenship,” “poverty,” “unjust educational and legal system,” and “Biya’s nearly 
forty years reign” (compiled from reponses to questionnaires completed by Anglophones). 
Even Francophones who traditionally dismissed Anglophones as “Anglo-fou” and 
“Biafrans” questioned the government’s heavy-handed response to what they considered 
“legitimate” demands, as shown in the following responses to questionnaires: 
D’après moi, les anglophones au début, revendiquaient l’égalité des droits entre 
les deux langues nationales du Cameroun qui sont l’Anglais et le Francais. Ills 
voulaient être traits de la même façon que les Francophones sur le plan politique, 
professionnel et social. [According to me, Anglophones requested, from the 
beginning, that the two national languages, English and French, be treated 
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equally. They demanded equality with Francophones in political, professional and 
social dimensions.] 
Ceux de la crise du mal-être social politique et économique de la sciente 
Camerounaise. [This is the crisis of social, political, and economic malaise of the 
Cameroonian society.] 
Ce pour moi nous avons: la marginalisation, la mauvaise gestion du pays, la non-
governance. [According to me we have: marginalization, mismanagement of the 
country, and weak political institutions.] 
La première cause est la revendication des avocats anglophones qui insurgent 
contre les dysfountionnements sous le sous-système judiciarire anglophone, le 
prendre revendication poite sur l’inexistence de la version anglaise au Cameroun 
des actes OHADA. Ils contestent également l’application du code civil 
francophone dans la justification des régions du sud-ouest et nord-ouest. Nous 
avons également la evendicatrons des enseignants du sous-système anglophone 
qui dénoncent l’absorption de leur sous-système par les francophones. [From the 
beginning, Anglophone lawyers protested the demotion of the Common Law or 
the English judicial system in the country. They also protested that Cameroon 
OHADA business law had not been translated into English. They decried the 
excessive use of the French civil code in the southwest and northwest regions. 




Les trois principals causes des problèmes anglophones sont l’arrestation des 
avocats qui avaient voulu organiser une grève stipulant au gouvernement 
d’arrêter d’envoyer des avocats francophones dans les tribunau anglophones, la 
mort de 17 personnes suite à cette grève de 2016 par ces avocats anglophones et 
enseignants; enfin la révolte des populations anglophones face aux multiples 
jamais résolus dont ils font face et donc ils parlent de discrimination linguistique. 
[The three main causes of the anglophone problems are: the arrest of lawyers who 
protested the use of Francophone judges in courts in the Anglophone region; the 
death of seventeen people during the lawyers and teachers strike of 2016; and 
finally Anglophones protested the many unresolved discriciminatory practices 
especially in the area of language.] 
Je pense que les problèmes anglophones préposent sur: la marginalisation des 
minorités, la culture non reconnue, l’économie dans la distribution des 
ressources, la non-participation au prévoir politiques. [I think that the 
Anglophone Crisis resulted from: marginalization of minorities, disrespect of 
Anglophone cultural heritage, inequitable distribution of the nation’s resources, 
and the failure to give Anglophones real political power.] 
Nous avons d’abord l’hypercentralisation de l’état qui Fail en sorte que les 
populations ne participant pas réellement a legertion des affaires publiques. Nous 
avons ensuite la paupérisation des populations qui vivent dans une misère et 
pauvreté extrême et qui au fur des jours assiste à la dégradation de leurs 
conditions de vie. Enfin nous avons l’inégalité dans la distribution des richesses 
entre les couches sociales différentes existait dans ces zones du Cameroun. Telles 
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sont selon nous quelques causes problème Anglophone. [We have, first of all, a 
very centralized and exclusive governmental system resulting in little or no 
participation from the people. For a long time, the people have been living in 
misery, and nothing was done to correct the situation. There is a feeling of 
destitution. Finally, the excessive greed and unequal distribution of wealth in the 
country gave birth to the Anglophone Crisis.] 
Another Francophone, David Abouem a Tchoyi, who previously held several positions in 
Biya’s government, likened the Anglophone Crisis to an emerging Boko Haram in the region, 
arguing the Anglophone Crisis resulted from six sources: failure of the centralized government 
system in the country, failure to implement promises made during the 1961 referendum, failure 
to implement the Foumban agreement, failure to place English at the same level as the French 
language, failure to promote Anglophone legal and educational institutions, and changing the 
name of the country from “federal” to “united” and to “republic” without consultation with 
Anglophones (Kamé 2018, 95-96). Tchoyi warned that the Anglophone Crisis could not be 
resolved without addressing those issues (La Nouvelle Expression, May 16, 2019; Cameroon 
Info-Net, January 10, 2017). His argument and the responses to questionnaires show that 
Francophones agreed that Anglophones had legitimate reasons to strike. 
Failures by the Biya government to address concerns of protesters accelerated grassroots 
mobilization. This miscalculation turned out to be perhaps a key turning point in the protest. 
Historical precedents point to the effectiveness of the role of the masses in bringing about 
change. In the French Revolution, the storming of the Bastille changed the direction of things. In 
Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah turned to the masses to defeat British imperialism, and in India, 
Mahatma Gandhi did the same. In Kenya, the Mau-Mau uprising was shaped by peasants, and in 
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the United States, the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. built a civil rights movement around the 
masses. The masses dismantled South Africa’s Apartheid. As Fanon rightly stated, the masses 
generally do not give up (1963). 
With schools closed and the judicial system crippled in the Anglophone regions, the 
government began to take the protest seriously. Meetings between Prime Minister Philemon 
Yang and Paul Ghogomu Mingo, director of the prime minister’s cabinet, produced no tangible 
results. Prior to those meetings, the government had addressed some of the concerns raised by 
teachers and lawyers. For instance, there had already been an announcement to recruit one 
thousand teachers, an approval to set aside two billion francs to assist non-public schools, and an 
agreement to transfer Francophone teachers from Anglophone schools. Of those arrested, 
twenty-one of the eighty-two had been released (Kamé 2018, 101). But that was not enough. On 
December 27, Agbor Balla warned: “We are calling for the immediate and unconditional release 
of all those kidnapped and transferred to Yaoundé! Without that, no dialogue can take place” 
(The Sun, January 13, 2017). Strike leaders acted on their threats. They called for the 
enforcement of “ghost town” for January 9, 2017, the day schools were to resume for the second 
term. Each side watched and waited for a breakthrough. 
Furious at the slow pace of things, the government acted. Government representatives 
likened strike leaders to “terrorists” intent on hijacking the academic future of young people. 
From there, things unraveled quickly (The Post, December 16, 2016). When strike leaders 
attempted to introduce on the agenda a discussion on the form of government, the government hit 
back, asking them to focus on the reasons they gave for the strike. “Of all the pertinent issues we 
discussed, we discovered that federalism is a taboo to this government,” said Harmony Bobga 
Mbuton, president of the Northwest Lawyers’ Association (Cameroon Report, May 8-10, 2017; 
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The Post, November 28, 2016; January 9, 2017). Yet by walking away from the table, especially 
so close to the resumption of the new school term, both sides miscalculated. Once schools were 
closed, and as egos crept into the negotiation—combined with intense suspicion of each other—
it became clear they would be locked in a collision course for a long time. And that is what 
happened. 
Schools in the Anglophone region did not resume at the beginning of the second term, 
thereby making education a major casualty of the strike (The Guardian Post, January 10, 2017; 
The Post, June 30, 2017; Sa’ah 2018; Mua 2017; Adams November 18, 2016). Those 
interviewed stated that the social consequences of this no-school policy for young people would 
probably not be known until years later. A resident of Buea noted, “Our children; the future of 
our country no longer goes to school. They are growing up illiterate. Think about that” 
(Edimensumbe, correspondence with the author, 2018). That said it all. 
As both sides dug in, the Biya team went on the offensive. Paul Atanga Nji, then minister 
in charge of special duties at the presidency, rejected the notion of the Anglophone Crisis: “I can 
say straight away that there is no Anglophone Crisis in Cameroon and those who talk about it, I 
can say that they are imposters who are in search of notoriety.” He added, “Anglophones are not 
marginalized in Cameroon” (Kamé 2018, 88). Still more from him: “How can you be talking 
about marginalization when for the past 25 years all prime ministers of Cameroon have been 
Anglophones” (The Guardian Post Daily, November 25, 2016, 3; The Horizon, June 12, 2018). 
Then, because Biya occasionally spoke English, he continued, Biya could not be anti-
Anglophone. In short, Atanga Nji’s position was simple: The problems in the Anglophone 
regions were fomented by outside forces. He warned the strikers to either return home or face the 
wrath of the law. Few statements fueled more anger among Anglophones than Atanga Nji’s. As a 
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cabinet minister from Akum in Bamenda in the Anglophone region, he had touched a raw nerve 
by agreeing with Francophone government elites that the notion of an Anglophone Crisis was a 
fraud invented by a minority of the population. Responses to questionnaires labeled him “Judas,” 
“traitor,” “curse,” and an “embarrassment” to Anglophones. He was, an interviewee stated, the 
epitome of the reasons Anglophones should not trust “elites.” 
Next in line was Communication Minister Issa Tchiroma Bakary, who also denied the 
existence of the Anglophone Crisis. Like Atanga Nji, he declared that the teachers and lawyers 
were being exploited by outside forces intent on destabilizing the nation (The Post, November 
18, 2016). He was among the first regime spokespersons to publicly label protesters as 
“terrorist,” and as responses to questionnaires made clear, Anglophones never forgave him for 
that. He was Biya’s chief propagandist, an interviewee stated. Minister of Justice and Keeper of 
the Seals Laurent Esso also weighed in. At a meeting in Yaoundé, he ordered the lawyers to 
return to work and obey the law (The Post, November 11, 2016). The meeting, the lawyers later 
stated, was a waste of time, and they confirmed that the Biya team was more interested in games 
than in looking for solutions (Guardian Post, November 24, 2016). The strike went on. 
Government failure to take the strike more seriously was alarming. Though the list of 
grievances provided by the teachers’ unions and Common Law lawyers did not specifically 
request a return to federalism, statements made by leaders were revealing. On the eve of the new 
term, Tassang warned, “We will know whether Yaoundé controls Anglophone Cameroon or we 
control our country. After Monday, we will think of what to do to put the government crawling 
on its knees” (The Sun, January 13, 2017). Attempts to reach a truce deadlocked. As the no-
school policy was enforced in the Anglophone region, those with means relocated their children 
to Francophone Cameroon to attend school. “It is very expensive, but I had to take my three 
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children and send to Yaoundé to go to school,” a resident of Kumba stated. With a no-school 
policy in one region, Cameroon quickly became “two separate nations in one.” The major losers 
quickly became the poor. On Monday, January 9, 2017, as children in the Francophone region 
returned to school, those in the Anglophone region stayed home. It was the first stoppage of its 
kind in the nation’s history. With this, both the government and the leadership of the CACSC 
became accessories to the destruction of the educational future of the region’s youth. 
A week after the beginning of the second term, the government had had enough. On 
January 17, 2017, the minister of territorial administration and decentralization, René Emmanuel 
Sadi, signed a decree banning CACSC and SCNC, and soon after that, Agbor Balla, Fontem 
Neba, and others were arrested and sent to the nation’s notorious Kondegui Prison in Yaoundé. 
Wilfred Tassang slipped out of the country and avoided arrest at that time, but Tassang was 
among those picked up in Abuja with the Ambazonia president. Mancho Bibixy, a popular radio 
announcer who gained notoriety after he carried a coffin to the protest to announce his 
willingness to die for the cause, was arrested on January 20 (Kamé 2018, 97-98; The Guardian 
Post, January 18, 2017; January 20, 2017). Those arrests turned out to be another major 
miscalculation. The government, a respondent wrote, “made a huge blunder by arresting 
Anglophone representatives who wanted a peaceful resolution of the crisis, hence … opening the 
way for more violent representatives.” Another added that the administration’s tactics were 
misguided because “a political problem cannot be solved by using military operations.” With the 
leadership in jail, the voices of peaceful negotiators were pushed out. It was a “terrible mishap,” 
an observer argued, adding it “gave way for leadership of the struggle to be handed to those in 
the Diaspora who wanted nothing short of secession” (The Post, April 10, 2017). 
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During the period when Balla and his colleagues were detained, little happened. Rather, 
the government continued to go after protesters, and the situation deteriorated. Schools remained 
closed, and even the few schools that opened their doors experienced enormous absences, 
threats, and kidnaps (BBC News, February 18, 2019). Parents were hesitant to send children to 
school for fear of what might happen. What follows is a description of the circumstances faced 
by a teacher who escaped and became an IDP in Douala: 
One lady, in her late twenties, and a former high school teacher in Bamenda, 
noted a member of the Ambazonia “boys” came to her class disguised as one of 
the students. He wore the school uniform and sat quietly in the back. At the end of 
the class the student approached her with a warning: “Why are you coming to 
school? You must obey our orders. I know you. … I know where you live. … 
This is the only warning you will get.” It was nerve-racking, she said, more 
especially as some of her colleagues had already been tortured. For a moment she 
considered escaping into the bush but decided to get out of the region. “Those 
boys do not joke,” she said. She packed-up a few belongings, left her child with 
family, and headed to Douala. She imagined it would be a temporary move but 
already in her second year in town, she has doubts about returning to Bamenda 
(Amin, July 17, 2019). 
The consequences of the no-school policy were devastating. In Kumba, young people 
gallivanted through the streets. As the rate of juvenile delinquency went up, so did the rate of 
teenage pregnancy. A woman lamented when she discovered that her three daughters in Form 5, 
lower six, and upper six were all pregnant. Their situation was not unique. At the Kumba District 
Hospital, medical officials complained of the large number of young girls who came in for pre-
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natal care (Interviews conducted in Cameroon). The International Crisis Group, the United 
Nations Commission on Human Rights, and others complained of the rise in sexual violence and 
drug use by young people. There was hunger and pain (Africa Renewal, December 2018-March 
2019; Human Rights Watch, July 19, 2018; Africanews 2019). The responses to questionnaires 
revealed an overwhelming concern about the negative impact of the crisis on the region’s youth. 
A respondent wrote: “Many of these kids have stopped their education especially those whose 
parents are not financially viable. Many ladies especially in rural areas are becoming premature 
mothers while boys become thieves, fighters. … These kids now bear a foundation of anger, war, 
misconduct, etc.” Vices including “drugs,” “petit theft,” “arm robbery,” “common crime,” 
“scamming,” “baby mothers,” “physical and psychological trauma,” “school dropouts,” 
“gangsterism,” “rebels,” “rape,” “killings,” “prostitution,” and “illiteracy” were normalized 
among youths. One descriptive term—“diabolic”—carried an unforgettable tinge (responses to 
questionnaires). With schools closed, youths became easy targets either for Ambazonian  
recruiters or killings by government forces; parents lamented the unenviable position into which 
the conflict put their children (responses to questionnaires). Government forces proceeded with 
more atrocities. The Center for Human Rights and Democracy in Africa wrote that, as of May 
2019, 206 communities had been burned in the southwest and northwest regions (2019, June 3, 
2019). In fact, parts of the Anglophone region were “literally” dying (The Sun, April 22, 2019). 
By the middle of 2017, Biya had lost the opportunity to provide quick fixes to the 
problems as the protest gained increasing national and international attention. The international 
community began to pay attention (Human Rights Watch, July 19, 2018, International Crisis 
Group, August 2, 2017; The Washington Post, February 5, 2019; The Conversation, September 
27, 2018; The New York Times, September 24, 2018). The crisis also attracted attention from the 
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major powers, including the United States, Britain, France, and Canada (Foreign Policy, July 10, 
2019). Cameroon was fast becoming a pariah among the nations. Universities suspended their 
study-abroad programs in Cameroon. Tourism dropped. The Buea Mountain Race, a fixture of 
excitement, took place only under heavy security (All Africa, February 19, 2018). The African 
Cup of Nations (AFCON) dropped Cameroon as the host of the games (The Guardian, 
November 30, 2018). Terror, fear, and insecurity pervaded the Anglophone region. As Biya’s 
military intensified its activities against protesters, the separatist forces grew relentless in their 
tactics of hit and run, kidnap, and terror of the local population. 
In November 2017, six military officers were killed in Mamfe. Biya’s reaction was swift. 
During the prior months he had said little in public about the protest. He used this incident to 
declare his anti-Ambazonia policy, a policy of his government to pursue those he termed as 
“secessionists.” Returning from Côte d’Ivoire, where he had attended the fifth African Union- 
European Summit, he announced the policy at Nsimalen International Airport in Yaoundé. 
Cameroon, he announced, was a “victim to repeated terrorist attacks from secessionist groups,” 
and he vowed to “eliminate these criminals.” Those are “terrorists masquerading as 
secessionists,” he fumed. He ordered his armed forces to hunt down Ambazonia forces and their 
sympathizers (Ateba, December 1, 2017). In the Anglophone region, Biya’s message was 
interpreted as a formal declaration of war against the region, and nationalists vowed to defend 
the territory. Biya’s approach, respondents to questionnaires noted, was ill-informed and 
misguided. Rather than pursue avenues for dialogue, interviewees stated, Biya’s actions exposed 
his disdain for Anglophones. “Biya has never respected Anglophones,” one wrote. The war 
declaration hardened the position of separatists, prolonged the conflict, and contributed to more 
bloodshed and destruction of property (Responses to questionnaires). 
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Biya’s new offensive intensified the war. On January 5, 2018, Sisiku Julius Ayuk Tabe 
and the other leaders of the Ambazonia movement were arrested in Abuja, Nigeria, and sent to 
Nkondengui, Yaoundé, where they were detained and later sentenced to life imprisonment (All 
Africa, August 20, 2019; BBC, August 20, 2019). Their arrest led to more attacks as Anglophone 
groups made efforts to make them the face of Biya’s marginalization of the region. After their 
arrests, an important rally cry in the Anglophone region became, “Free our leaders.” Attacks on 
and burnings of communities believed to harbor suspected Ambazonia fighters intensified. Since 
Biya’s offensive began, over fifty communities had been burned, including Mbalangi, Kembong, 
Kwakwa, Boa Bakundu, Ekombe, Etam, and Kombone Mission (Tembon 2018). The British 
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) made documentaries of the burnings and the massive torture 
that charaterized the protest (BBC News, 2018). As the fighting intensified, so did the terror on 
the lives of locals. 
By the summer of 2018, the protest was in its most violent phase. Government military 
forces and the Ambazonia Defense Force were locked in a deadly embrace, and neither side was 
willing to blink. Stories of repeated killings, kidnaps, and torture dominated the news. A man in 
his twenties offered his reaction in an interview: “How man fit sleep for night? … Man dey get 
bad dream … all these die body … these people soso shoot, shoot. [How can one fall asleep? … 
One has nightmares … too many dead bodies … and all the continuous gunshots].” Another who 
escaped from Mbalangi to Douala promised never to return to his community. He was terrified 
by gunshots, corpses lying around, and the burnings (Interviews conducted in Cameroon). His 
comments echoed those of many in rural communities whom the conflict had displaced. Parts of 




Erosion of a way of Life 
Responses to questionnaires overwhelmingly stated that the conflict had eroded major aspects of 
the region’s lifestyle and culture. Things that people previously took for granted had become 
impossible to do. “A stroll to an off-license [bar] in the evening with a friend for a beer is no 
longer possible,” an interviewee in Bamenda noted. The economy of the Anglophone region was 
shattered. Businesses, shops, enterprises, and markets were either closed or functioned 
sporadically. In observance of the “ghost town” strike, mandated closures took place every 
Monday for more than three years, resulting in widespread hunger. Farmers abandoned farms for 
fear of attacks by either government or separatist forces. Major business owners previously based 
in Kumba and other towns in the region relocated to Douala (Reuters, April 29, 2018). Closed 
were the hotels, bars, restaurants, and other forms of businesses that catered to people in the 
evenings. Inter-city transportation was reduced to a bare minimum, and when vehicles moved 
from one city to the other, they traveled in convoys. In several cases, they were escorted by 
military vehicles (Amin 2018). 
Economic losses compounded. Cameroonians who went home for holidays and other 
festivities no longer did so. Their spending typically stimulated the economy, especially in 
businesses such as hotels whose profitability depended on catering to “bush fallers”3 who 
returned to Cameroon especially on holidays such as Christmas. The economic ruin was 
particularly profound at the region’s main agribusiness facility, the Cameroon Development 
Corporation, the heart of the region’s economy. Plantations that produced palm oil were no 
longer operational. Workers at banana plantations were brutalized, and rubber processors were 
repeatedly attacked. Families that depended on cocoa for their livelihood faced destitution. In 
June 2019, Christopher Ngalla, one of the managers at the CDC Plantations, reported that the 
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company had lost 32 billion francs CFA during the first part of the year and that more losses 
were ahead (Mbodiam 2019). 
Traditional practices eroded as well. Villages stopped “cry-die” celebrations, an 
important ritual that celebrated the life of those who transitioned into ancestors. It was too unsafe 
for such gatherings, traditional leaders stated. Many communities, including Lewoh in Lebialem 
Division, turned into no-go areas. The unrest also prompted other cultural changes. Irrespective 
of where people resided, Cameroonians had typically preferred their burial sites to be in their 
villages of origin. Not anymore. Increasingly, people chose to be buried anywhere possible 
(Nchinda 2018). Even SAGI, a Cameroonian-run insurance company created to transfer remains 
from the US back to Cameroon reversed its previous policy from nonpayment of those who 
elected to be buried outside of Cameroon to payment. Because of insecurity, an increasing 
number of Cameroonians elected for their remains not to be transported to Cameroon (SAGI 
2018). 
Traditional rulers, known for the role they played in things such as conflict resolution and 
preservation of the people’s culture, escaped from their communities, and in many cases, their 
residences were vandalized by pro-separatist fighters. Some rulers were kidnapped (Daily News 
Cameroon, July 18, 2018). Terror was everywhere. A resident of Buea who had initially 
supported the protest stated, “We have suffered long enough. … Amba should leave us alone.” 
That was not a unique situation. By mid-2018, similar stories were repeatedly told (Interviews 
conducted in Cameroon). 
The list of hardships was long. School buildings remained empty. Refugees and internally 
displaced people were nowhere close to returning to their homes. In communities in Anglophone 
Cameroon, basic services such as trash collection no longer existed. Trash piled up in cities, and 
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corpses were routinely seen on roadsides. The moral fabric of the community broke down. The 
authority of trusted institutions such as the family, church, traditional meeting groups, and 
schools, which historically maintained and provided guidance to society’s values, eroded 
(Interviews conducted in Cameroon). 
Despite the impact of the protest on the people’s culture, locals did not waver in the 
reasons they supported the protest. They were knowledgeable about the resources that came from 
the region. The region produced cocoa, rubber, timber, and coffee, and it had oil. Yet little of the 
revenue was returned to the region for development. A respondent wrote: “I will conclude by 
saying that Anglophones have been abandoned in terms of infrastructural development, road 
construction, social balance, and many others. With all these, they had the right to react, but the 
incompetent and self-centered government ignored our grievances and instead sent us troops to 
molest and kill us. The government of Cameroon has failed drastically.” This feeling was 
reflected in roughly 8 percent of responses to questionnaires and oral interviews. The 
Anglophone Crisis, irrespective of how it was framed, turned out to be a struggle over basic 
needs. When ordinary people spoke of marginalization, their reference point was economic, not 
high ministerial positions and directorship positions. Marginalization translated into economic 
exclusion, and the violence that resulted contributed to an erosion of the way of life in the region. 
Social Media: A Game-Changer 
Social media transformed the nature of protest activities in the twenty-first century. In 2010, 
Mohamed Bouazizi, a petit trader in Tunisia, set himself on fire to protest economic hardships 
placed on him and others by Tunisian political leaders. His action sparked the Arab Spring, an 
internet phenomenon. Increasingly, social media has become an important tool used by 
nationalists to chastise authoritarian regimes on the continent. Thus, several African nations, 
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including Ethiopia, Chad, Algeria, and Sudan, have already disconnected internet services at 
different points to counteract social media’s power. 
So, the use of social media to inform others about the crisis in Cameroon was not unique. 
From the beginning, lawyers boasted that they used social media to achieve many of their early 
objectives: “We have sensitized ourselves significantly enough on our Facebook WhatsApp 
group exchanges and at our monthly gatherings. So, we are more than ripe to stand on our own. 
Belonging to a Bar Council where our interests is not protected is rubbish” (The Post, October 
14, 2016). Lawyers used this outlet to educate, inform, and mobilize locals to support their cause 
(Pommerolle and Heungoup 2017, 530). As the demonstration turned violent, images of 
beatings, burning buildings, and use of tear gas were posted online.4 
By January 17, 2017, the Biya regime, having had enough of that, proceeded to interrupt 
internet services in the Anglophone regions (Cameroon Report, May 8-10, 2017). Eden 
newspaper reported at the time that Chief Senator Tabetando bragged at the Southwest Elite 
Forum on February 2 that he requested internet services be disconnected in the Southwest 
Region because it had been used to spread all types of rumors and misinformation (Eden 
February 6, 2017). Bouopda Pierre Kamé stated that internet service was disconnected to disrupt 
foreign influence on events in Cameroon. Cameroonians in the diaspora, he noted, used the 
internet to spread false information in the hopes of destabilizing the nation and used it to wire 
money to fund the “criminal activities of their accomplices based in Cameroon” (2018, 98). The 
government argued there was evidence that money came “from abroad to incite disorder and 
fund calls for federalism and secession” (Kamé 2018, 85). But the government also used social 
media to counter those stories, arguing that its goal was to restore peace and stability and to stop 
the misinformation spread by those in the diaspora. Biya used Facebook to promote the 
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government’s anti-protest position. Realizing that separatists were winning in the propaganda 
war, the government acted while blaming the other side. Irrespective of the reasons brought 
forward for disconnecting internet services, the action backfired. And as George Ogola has 
argued, internet shutdown encouraged the proliferation of those “rumors” that governments 
sought to squash by shutting internet services to begin with (2019). 
Government action was a desperate attempt to control information about the protest. 
Cameroonians who lived in the city of Tiko basically took the thirty-minute Okada or taxi ride 
across the River Mungo so that they could use internet services in Douala. The action played into 
the hands of those in the diaspora. They pointed to atrocities committed by the military in rural  
communities, raised money, published fiery articles to online groups, created pro-Ambazonia 
websites, and regularly issued dicta against the Biya government. Cameroonians turned to 
Twitter and Facebook and reached more people. Videos of refugees living in makeshift homes in 
refugee camps across the borders in Nigeria and eking a living from bare necessities, as well as 
videos of women’s stories about their lives in bushes, spread rapidly. These videos imploded 
government statements about managing the crisis, intensifying calls to Biya from the global 
community to stop the mayhem in his country. Julius T. Nganji and Lynn Cockburn have written 
that the most common hashtags of the Anglophone Crisis included “#BringBackOurInternet, 
#FreeAllArrested and #Ambazonia” (May 24, 2019; The Conversation, June 17, 2019). Such 
major media outlets as The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Conversation, BBC, and 
The Guardian increasingly exposed the brutality of the conflict. Some likened the situation to the 
Rwandan genocide, challenging major powers to do something (Journal du Cameroun, January 
1, 2019). Many in the diaspora organized protest activities wherever the Cameroonian leader 
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visited, especially at the InterContinental Hotel in Geneva, where he spent a significant amount 
of time (Ilwareed Online, July 4, 2019). 
Cameroonians in the diaspora led the anti-Biya campaign on social media while 
mandating the local population in Cameroon to enforce “ghost town.” However, when those 
pronouncements escalated into tacit endorsement of kidnaps, decapitations, and other outright 
brutalities against those who disobeyed, previous supporters of the protest became critical of the 
role of those in the diaspora. Interviews and responses to questionnaires showed mixed reactions 
toward them. Though many of those in the diaspora were praised for “speaking up” and for 
exposing the problems of the Anglophone regions, interviewees were also critical of what they 
referred to as the “hypocrisy” and “deceitful ways” of the diaspora population. They accused 
pro-Ambazonian Cameroonians in the diaspora of “manipulation” and of using the crisis “to seek 
asylum for friends and relatives.” A recurring criticism was how Cameroonians living in the 
diaspora could oppose the reopening of schools in the country but celebrate graduations of their 
friends and family on Facebook. Others challenged diaspora Cameroonians that one way to show 
their support was for them to quit their jobs and withdraw their children from school, just as was 
taking place in the region. In fact, by the end of the second year of the protest, locals had 
increasingly become critical of self-proclaimed leaders in the diaspora. Below is a sample of 
responses reflecting general opinions against pro-Ambazonia Anglophones in the diaspora: 
I think they are cowards forcing people in the country to fight when they are safe 
in their home and their children are in school. Let them come to Ambazonia and 
back their words with their actions.  
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My message to those who are out there posting things is that they should not only 
stay out there and give instruction, they should come and fight the fight with us 
here. 
They are not Cameroonians because a true Cameroonian defends his country in 
his territory. They encourage the crisis whereas their children are comfortable 
schooling, so that when the most educated Cameroonian had been killed 
innocently, they should come back and take their position. 
Stop shouting from a telephone. We appreciate your efforts, but the fight is here 
in Cameroon. (Response to questionnaires) 
Of course, similar criticisms came from Francophone Cameroonians. At the onset of the 
crisis, they expressed reservation over government response, but by September 2018, they had 
grown critical of the damage caused in the Anglophone regions by the “Amba” fighters. Below is 
another sample of opinions expressed in response to questionnaires: 
La situation générale est plutôt alarmante. Les anglophones de souches vivent 
dans l’angoisse et la peur. Ils n’ont plus de vie, le Nord-Ouest et le Sud-Ouest 
sont devenus des villes mortes. La vie n’est qu’une image incolore. Les 
anglophones vivent une vie de misère, de famine, certains ont fui. Il est également 
vrai que les meurtres et les enlèvements observés sur les réseaux sociaux et à la 
télévision sont comme des films d’horreur qui peuvent laisser tout le monde dans 
un traumatisme. À Yaoundé, vous ne pouvez pas ressentir ce qu’ils ressentent. 
[The situation is alarming. Anglophones live in anguish and fear. The northwest 
and southwest regions are literally dying. Life is stagnant. In those regions, there 
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is misery, starvation, and many people have emigrated from the region. The 
repeated murders and kidnappings shown on social media and TV have turned the 
place into the type of things seen in horror movies. It is difficult to understand that 
life from living in Yaoundé.] 
Le Cameroun anglophone aujourd’hui s’effondre dans l’ombre. Les enfants ne 
vont plus à l’école, les hôpitaux et ceux qui y travaillent ne sont plus en sécurité. 
En bref, Bamenda et Buea se sont transformés en un cimetière où nous enterrons 
chaque jour sans au revoir. Les frères sont devenus des hommes mangeurs 
(cannibalisme), les événements sont si désastreux, effrayants et très tristes. 
[Anglophone Cameroon is imploding. Nothing is working: Children no longer go 
to school, and there is no safety for employees at the hospital and other places. 
Anglophone cities of Bamenda and Buea have become a graveyard where many 
are buried without a funeral. The young men have become cannibals. The 
situation is both frightful and tragic.] 
In addition to disconnecting internet services, the government erred by failing to accept 
the Catholic Church’s offer to mediate the crisis. Church groups played a vital role in education 
in Anglophone Cameroon, especially at the primary and secondary levels. The strike, bishops 
wrote, had a devastating impact on their ability to deliver education to the community, and they 
requested to meet with government representatives to find solutions. The government refused the 
church’s offer to assist in solving the problems (Mail & Guardian, May 8, 2018; The Catholic 
Worldview Report, September 13, 2019). Instead, the government took church groups to court 
for failing to open schools (The Post, April 21, 2017). 
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Voices of Protest and Anger 
At an Anglophone Restaurant in Biyemassi, Yaoundé, crowds that poured in and ate traditional 
Cameroonian food willingly expressed opinions on the origins and potential solutions of the 
crisis. While they vehemently condemned what they described as “la République’s military 
occupation” of Anglophone Cameroon, they decried the culture of kidnappings and brutality that 
had become normalized in the Anglophone territory: “Why would they attack people and claim 
the revolution is to help them?” some asked. “What had been created in the region was fear … 
people obeyed ‘country-Sunday’ [“ghost town”] not because they support the protest but because 
they fear their stores would be burnt,” a resident of Buea informed the author. Another added: 
We have destroyed our best enterprises CDC, PAMOL, the cocoa industry, our 
budding workforce, ruined our breadbasket that feeds the nation by burning our 
villages where food comes from, kidnapped our people to extort money from an 
already impoverished populace more than any roadside policeman could ever 
manage to extort from us in our entire lifetimes, shed more blood of our fellow 
citizens—with Anglophones bearing the brunt of the assault—that left our streets 
running crimson with the blood of our fallen brethren and sistren and our homes 
pockmarked with bullets. 
Those who gathered at the restaurant were overwhelmingly critical of Biya’s failure to go 
on television and address the crisis when it started. “Cameroonians are a peaceful people and do 
not like war,” a customer at the restaurant stated, noting that the problem would have been 
resolved without bloodshed had the president just done his job. Another concurred in a response 
to a questionniare: 
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To his excellency, the president of Cameroon Paul Biya, please daddy 
Anglophones are suffering and dying every day. You alone can stop this crisis. 
Listen to your children complains and give solutions. Talk directly to the two 
regions because we do no longer have confidence in the Anglophone elites. 
During the crisis many in the northwest and southwest regions did not disguise their 
impatience with Anglophone eites. They labeled elites as “greedy,” “frauds,” “sell-outs,” and 
“liars” who cared only about their “stomachs.” Some even blamed them for the escalation of the 
crisis. They blamed the continuing crisis on elites: “The administration is failing every day 
because they keep sending elites in which we no longer trust to talk to us.” Another wrote, “It 
will not work because they are liars” (Responses to questionnaires). Traditionally, locals 
questioned the role of Anglophone elites in the struggle for justice arguing that they had 
consistently betrayed the aspirations of the people in the region (Nyamnjoh and Rowlands 1998; 
Fochingong 2005). 
On the topic of the form of the government, there was overwhelming support for a return 
to pre-1972 federalism. Responses to questionnaires repeatedly argued that federalism was the 
most viable solution to the current problems. According to them, the region’s economy 
flourished under the federal system, and they believed it would happen again. Repeatedly, 
responses to questionnaires overwhelmingly called for “inclusive dialogue,” “genuine dialogue,” 
or “dialogue” to solve the problems. To them, dialogue translated to a restoration of federalism; 
the demilitarization of the Anglophone regions; economic justice; massive rebuilding of 
infrastructure and destroyed communities; creation of a constitution giving Anglophones equal 
rights; and genuine equality of Francophones and Anglophones. While they noted that the protest 
had produced worthy results, those were not enough. OHADA was translated into English; a 
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presidential decree on January 23, 2017, created the National Commission for the Promotion of 
Bilingualism and Multiculturalism; and another order requested not only the creation of English 
law programs at the nation’s major universities, but also the creation of a faculty of law and 
political sciences at the University of Buea (Kamé 2018, 105; Kinsai 2017). 
On the topic of secession, a significant number of those interviewed and those who 
responded to questionnaires denied that secession was an original goal of the protest, arguing it 
came up as a result of the government’s failure to negotiate. Some noted that those living outside 
the country pushed the idea: “Look at them on YouTube—always shouting,” one stated 
(Responses to questionnaires). Another argued that “secession is a desperate attempt by people 
whose history is rife with war, and war has never solved any problem, and secession will 
certainly create more problems than it will solve” (Responses to questionnaires). The focus on 
secession angered respondents because it distracted from the problems that gave rise to the 
protest. Secession and the resulting violence, indeed, overshadowed the protest’s social justice 
causes. Francophone Cameroonians saw secession as a “utopia” that did not represent the 
aspiration of the Anglophones they knew (Responses to questionnaires). 
Whatever the rights and wrongs of the various arguments for secession, blunders by the 
Biya team gave pro-secession people a larger platform. Failures to implement the 
decentralization decree signed into law over twenty-five years ago prompted frustration. At his 
inauguration to a seventh term, Biya announced that he would accelerate the process of 
decentralization, and two months later in another speech, he noted he would take affirmative 
action measures to fast-track decentralization. And again, when he spoke on the Anglophone 
Crisis on September 10, 2019, he promised to move quickly with decentralization. Yet delays 
and shifting timetables to implement policies created distrust and an overall sense that he was not 
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reliable. To some, the notion of decentralization had always been a farce designed to distract 
from Anglophones’ request for a return to federalism. Biya’s promises, they noted, meant 
nothing. 
Conclusions and Recommendations for Change 
The Anglophone Crisis reaffirmed that the Cameroon nation, sixty years after reunification, 
remains an “experiment.” In their responses to questionnaires, Cameroonians on both sides of the 
River Mungo described the country as two nations with two separate cultures, unequal and 
hostile to each other. Even though Biya had repeatedly stated, “Cameroon will remain one and 
indivisible,” the evidence has pointed to the opposite. During his nearly forty years in power, his 
policies deepened the economic, cultural, and social divide in the country. Though Cameroon 
prides itself in being “Africa in miniature,” and though Biya has repeatedly argued that the 
nation’s diversity is at the foundation of its strength, the biggest challenge for Cameroon remains 
its multicultural and multilingual diversity—this despite the Anglophone Crisis presenting so 
many opportunities to create and implement policies reflecting the diverse nature of the country. 
An early initiative two months after the start of the protest was the creation of the National 
Commission for the Promotion of Bilingualism and Multiculturalism, but that agency continues 
to languish in oblivion with little to show after three years in existence. 
Quite alarming was the absence of a long-term vision to address the crucial issues that 
gave birth to the Anglophone Crisis. In his New Year address to the nation on December 31, 
2019, Biya praised the National Assembly and the Senate for passing a bill that “provides for 
equal use of English and French” in the nation’s public institutions and for making strides to 
implement the decentralization decree signed into law decades ago. As has happened many times 
in the past, mechanisms to implement those laws were not put in place, and locals dismissed 
them as the “same old delaying tactics.” In short, the nation’s political and economic institutions 
35 
 
remain too weak and too corrupt to implement new policies. They must be promptly reformed 
and strengthened, and the judiciary must be empowered and given independence to operate 
without intervention from the presidency. Measures to restore a sense of accountability must be 
put in place and enforced. Months after the October 2019 National Dialogue conferred onto the 
Anglophone region the “special status” preference, little has changed in the region as critics 
likened the initiative to the familiar “empty promises” and “gradualism” that has never yielded 
measurable results. 
The Anglophone Crisis offers other lessons. It demonstrates that the power to destroy is 
not the power to control. Despite the regime’s destruction of communities, Ambazonia fighters 
and supporters could not be subdued. Biya’s repeated references to the opposition as “terrorists” 
and “armed gangs” undermined efforts for initiatives to resolve the crisis. It was a blunder of the 
first magnitude,and the consequences of such mistakes were far-reaching. The government’s call 
for unconditional surrender prolonged the conflict and resulted in many more deaths. But lessons 
did emerge from the actions of the armed opposition. For all the failures of the Biya regime to 
address issues raised by the conflict, separatists failed to garner support from locals. In fact, their 
support base dwindled after they resorted to tactics of terror and fear. Locals were repulsed by 
violence, threats, and destruction committed by pro-Ambazonia fighters. Those actions made 
supporters and skeptics more critically examine the motives, vision, and ideology of separatists. 
Besides the message of secession, separatists could not articulate how the outcome of the conflict 
would benefit the ordinary Okada (taxi driver), farmer, homemaker, or school dropout, so many 
of them displaced as a result of the conflict. 
The absence of inspired leadership in the opposition is notable. Unlike successful 
nationalist movements, separatists presented different advocates at different times, depending on 
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the argument at hand. Self-proclaimed leaders emerged in rapid succession and set up online 
sites that threatened any dissent. Additional problems arose. Few people knew much about the 
nationalist struggles of Ayuk Tabe prior to his being named president of the virtual Ambazonia 
Republic, and as a result, many easily withdrew their support when separatists began to engage 
in gross human rights violations. Attempts by supporters to place Ayuk Tabe and others in the 
same league as Nelson Mandela, Samora Machel, Kwame Nkrumah, Steve Biko, Thomas 
Sankara, and Jomo Kenyatta were unconvincing and thus met with failure. 
I argue that there must be a long-term solution to the Anglophone Crisis. Those at the 
grassroots level are focused on issues of bread and butter—of basic needs and of human dignity 
and respect. Several initiatives are promising on the political, diplomatic, and economic fronts. 
Efforts to fast-track decentralization are encouraging, but it must be accelerated. People must be 
made to believe in their government again. Rather than handing out mattresses, bottles of 
cooking oil, and a few cups of rice, the Biya government must engage in a massive rebuilding 
effort to provide housing for those whose communities were burned down. Those efforts will in 
turn provide jobs and put money in those communities. People are looking for work, not 
handouts. The regime must redouble efforts to eliminate corruption and bring to government 
people who can bring ideas that solve problems. The regime also might institute immediate relief 
and recovery programs, after which it must proceed to reform the system. There must be a 
massive effort to create employment, build the infrastructure, and provide incentives for 
companies to relocate from cities such as Douala, already too congested, to neighboring cities 
such as Tiko, Buea, Mutengene, and Limbe, which are less than an hour’s drive from Douala. 
Immediate gestures of good faith could include work on the Limbe Seaport and on the Tiko 
Airport. Educational policies must stop treating Anglophones as passive observers in society. 
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Young Cameroonians must see both Anglophone and Francophone residents at every level of 
government, on every rung of the business ladder, on every management position, at every 
school—even on every billboard advertisement. Only such a widespread and visible approach 
can convincingly challenge Cameroon’s chronic pattern of discrimination and exclusion. 
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